Arbeitspapier
Asymmetric Discouragement in Asymmetric Contests
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6108
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
asymmetric contest
discouragement effect
disappointment aversion
laboratory experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
March, Christoph
Sahm, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- March, Christoph
- Sahm, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2016