Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric obligations

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such 'expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3450

Classification: Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General

Subject: non-binding obligations
expressive law
public goods
experiment
Soziale Norm
Normbefolgung
Öffentliches Gut
Wiederholte Spiele
Test

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Riedel, Nadine
Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

(where): Munich

(when): 2011

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46303

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Show original at data provider

Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Riedel, Nadine
Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

2011

Other Objects (12)

Arbeitspapier