Arbeitspapier
Asymmetric Discouragement in Asymmetric Contests
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6108
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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asymmetric contest
discouragement effect
disappointment aversion
laboratory experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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March, Christoph
Sahm, Marco
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2016
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- March, Christoph
- Sahm, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2016