Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric Discouragement in Asymmetric Contests

We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6108

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
asymmetric contest
discouragement effect
disappointment aversion
laboratory experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
March, Christoph
Sahm, Marco
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • March, Christoph
  • Sahm, Marco
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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