Arbeitspapier

Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to moderate the favorite, while the strongest type of the favorite will try to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. Self-disclosure is optimal even though a weak favorite or strong underdog may be induced to raise their efforts, i.e., show "dominant" or "defiant" reactions. To avert Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog. We also consider partial information release, cheap talk, Bayesian persuasion, information design, correlation, and continuous types. Applications are discussed. The proofs employ novel arguments in monotone comparative statics and an improved version of Jensen's inequality.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 279

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Labor Discrimination
Thema
Asymmetric contests
incomplete information
disclosure
strategic complements and substitutes
dominance and defiance
Bayesian persuasion
Jensen's inequality
Spieltheorie
Ungerechtigkeit
Auskunft
Dominanz
Abweichendes Verhalten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ewerhart, Christian
Grünseis, Julia
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-149332
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Grünseis, Julia
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2021

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