Strategic disclosure of demand information by duopolists: Theory and experiment

Arbeitspapier

We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor´s product-market strategy. Subsequently, we analyze the firms' behavior in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects often use selective disclosure strategies, and this finding appears to be robust to changes in the information structure, the mode of competition, and the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, in our experiment, subjects´ product-market conduct is largely consistent with theoretical predictions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2015/9

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
• Thema: common value ; product differentiation ; asymmetry ; duopoly ; information disclosure ; skewed distribution ; incomplete information ; laboratory experiment ; Cournot competition ; Bertrand competition

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jansen, Jos ; Pollak, Andreas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121266
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ