Voluntary Environmental Agreements, Emission Taxes and International Trade: The Importance of the Timing of Strategies
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Discussion Papers / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Department of Economics ; 562
- Keyword
-
Gemeinlastprinzip
Umweltpolitik
Selbstverpflichtung
Umweltabgabe
Umweltsteuer
Spieltheorie
Außenhandelspolitik
Theorie
Wirtschaftspolitik ; Emission ; Steuer
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (who)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
- (when)
-
1999
- Creator
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-10483
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:55 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Conrad, Klaus
- Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
Time of origin
- 1999
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Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements
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Voluntary environmental agreements, emission taxes and international trade: The importance of the timing of strategies
Non-Verifiable Emissions, Voluntary Agreements, and Emission Taxes
Voluntary agreements with industry
Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Voluntary agreements and competition law
Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
On the timing of climate agreements
On the Timing of ClimateAgreements
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements