Arbeitspapier
Incentive pay for policy-makers?
We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to invest in better outcomes of some tasks. We develop a political agency model with two tasks and only one measurable outcome. In such an environment, policy-makers choose socially inefficient public good levels and expropriate minorities. A judicious combination of constitutional limits on taxation and incentive pay for policy-makers is second-best. Incentive pay is conditional on the public good level.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 18/307
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
incentive contracts
politicians
multi-task problems
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Britz, Volker
Ebrahimi, Afsoon
Gersbach, Hans
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2018
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000316287
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Britz, Volker
- Ebrahimi, Afsoon
- Gersbach, Hans
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2018
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