Arbeitspapier
Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 129.2005
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Public Goods
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
-
Cycles
Alternation
Public goods
Advantage
Opposition
Politischer Konjunkturzyklus
Öffentliches Gut
Median Voter
Öffentlicher Konsum
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gautier, Pascal
Soubeyran, Raphael
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gautier, Pascal
- Soubeyran, Raphael
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2005
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