Arbeitspapier
Wage Indexation And Political Cycles
If the wage indexation rate is chosen discretionarily, a Left hand government lowers it in order to increase the output effects of surprise inflation, while a Right hand government prefers high indexation. These choices magnify the differences between the inflation rates preferred by the two parties. When binding commitments before the signature of the labor contract are possible, both parties prefer a higher wage indexation with respect to the discretionary situation, in order to reduce the inflationary bias.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 256
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Scorcu, Antonello Eugenio
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
-
1996
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5054
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Scorcu, Antonello Eugenio
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1996
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