Arbeitspapier
Separation of powers and political budget cycles
From a theoretical viewpoint, political budget cycles (PBC) arise in equilibrium when rational voters are imperfectly informed about the incumbent's competency and the incumbent enjoys discretionary power over the budget. This paper focuses on the second condition, examining how executive discretion is affected by the budgetary process under separation of powers. We specifically model PBC in the composition of government spending. The main result is that effective checks and balances in the budgetary process curb PBC. The institutional features of the executive-legislature bargaining game, namely, the actual agenda-setting authority, the status quo location and the degree of legislative oversight and control of the implementation of the budgetary law, play critical roles for the existence and the size of PBC. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings, which show that PBC are more pronounced in developing countries, where there are also less effective checks and balances.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Serie Documentos de Trabajo ; No. 251
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Thema
-
rational political budget cycles
budget composition
separation of powers
checks and balances
budgetary process
Politischer Konjunkturzyklus
Öffentlicher Haushalt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Saporiti, Alejandro
Streb, Jorge M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
- (wo)
-
Buenos Aires
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Saporiti, Alejandro
- Streb, Jorge M.
- Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
Entstanden
- 2003
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles
Political budget cycles and election outcomes
Political budget cycles in European public procurement
Conditional political budget cycles in Argentine provinces
Do expected downturns kill political budget cycles?
Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Swiss Cantons
Do expected downturns kill political budget cycles?
Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles?
Political budget cycles in European public procurement
Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles
Political budget cycles and election outcomes
Political budget cycles in European public procurement
Conditional political budget cycles in Argentine provinces
Do expected downturns kill political budget cycles?
Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Swiss Cantons
Do expected downturns kill political budget cycles?
Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles?
Political budget cycles in European public procurement
Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles
Political budget cycles and election outcomes
Political budget cycles in European public procurement
Conditional political budget cycles in Argentine provinces
Do expected downturns kill political budget cycles?
Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Swiss Cantons
Do expected downturns kill political budget cycles?
Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles?
Political budget cycles in European public procurement
Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process