Arbeitspapier

Political budget cycles in European public procurement

This paper studies whether political budget cycles occur in public procurement in the European Union. Using project- level data from Tenders Electronic Daily (2008-2018), I analyze different steps along the procurement process, namely the publication of the contract notice, the awarding of the contract, and the completion of the project. While there is no evidence of an increased activity in project completions, I find an increase in public procurement contract notices and awards prior to national parliamentary elections. This effect is more pronounced for visible and labor-intensive projects and can be interpreted as a "credible election promise", as the budget for the project is only committed at the time of the award and not spent yet.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 20-069

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Subject
public procurement
political budget cycles
elections
European Union

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Havlik, Annika
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Havlik, Annika
  • ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung

Time of origin

  • 2020

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