Arbeitspapier

Do expected downturns kill political budget cycles?

The political budget cycle (PBC) literature argues that governments expand deficits in election years. However, what happens when an economic downturn is expected? Will the government allow the deficit to expand even further, or will it resort to spending cuts and tax increases? When voters expect less than full automatic stabilization, our model shows that opportunistic government behavior leads to smaller deficits, thereby responding procyclically to expected downturns. Panel data evidence for 74 democracies covering the period 2000-2016 robustly supports the theoretical procyclicality prediction. Moreover, expected downturns remain significant when other context-conditional PBC effects are included in the empirical analysis.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: KOF Working Papers ; No. 481

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Fiscal Policy
Subject
political budget cycles
elections
growth expectations
economic downturns
precautionary voters
automatic stabilization
fiscal deficits

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bohn, Frank
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000421602
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bohn, Frank
  • Sturm, Jan-Egbert
  • ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute

Time of origin

  • 2020

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