Arbeitspapier
Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles
While existing cross-country studies on political budget cycles rely on annual data, we build a panel with quarterly and monthly data from Latin American and OECD countries over the 1980-2005 period. Disaggregated data allow to center the electoral year more precisely, and show the effects are concentrated in a three-quarter window around elections. Cycles are statistically significant only in Latin America, but the pattern is similar to OECD countries: the budget surplus/GDP ratio falls in the election period and rises in the post-election period. In line with the logic of rational opportunistic manipulation, these effects cancel out.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Serie Documentos de Trabajo ; No. 403
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General
- Thema
-
temporal aggregation
electoral window
pre- and post-electoral effects
political budget cycles
rational opportunistic cycles
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Streb, Jorge M.
Lema, Daniel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
- (wo)
-
Buenos Aires
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Streb, Jorge M.
- Lema, Daniel
- Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
Entstanden
- 2009
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