Arbeitspapier

When Inertia Generates Political Cycles

We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 91.2006

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
Political Cycles
Inertia
Politischer Konjunkturzyklus
Wahl
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Soubeyran, Raphäel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Soubeyran, Raphäel
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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