Arbeitspapier
When Inertia Generates Political Cycles
We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 91.2006
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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Political Cycles
Inertia
Politischer Konjunkturzyklus
Wahl
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Soubeyran, Raphäel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
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2006
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Soubeyran, Raphäel
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2006