Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

Abstract: "This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment." (author's abstract)

Object Details

• Alternative title: Sabotage in dynamischen Turnieren
• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource, 31 S.
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2009-06

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Soziale Probleme, Sozialdienste, Versicherungen ; Mathematik
• Keyword: Spieltheorie ; Arbeitsverhalten ; Leistungsmotivation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2009
• Creator: Gürtler, Oliver ; Münster, Johannes
• Contributor: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-258086
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:56 PM CET