Arbeitspapier
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but may treat individuals asymmetrically.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1142
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Barbera, Salvador
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1995
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Barbera, Salvador
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1995
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