Arbeitspapier

Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation

Similar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of) choice(s). Satisfiable aspirations in the sense that there exists some choice guaranteeing them define a much larger choice set whose intersection with the set of prior-free optimal choices is never empty. We also review experimental procedures and results which incentivize aspiration formation and reject even prior-free optimality experimentally.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2008,055

Classification
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Household Behavior: General
Subject
Satisficing
bounded rationality
optimality
Beschränkte Rationalität
Entscheidung
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Werner
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Werner
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2008

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