Arbeitspapier
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Similar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of) choice(s). Satisfiable aspirations in the sense that there exists some choice guaranteeing them define a much larger choice set whose intersection with the set of prior-free optimal choices is never empty. We also review experimental procedures and results which incentivize aspiration formation and reject even prior-free optimality experimentally.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2008,055
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Household Behavior: General
- Subject
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Satisficing
bounded rationality
optimality
Beschränkte Rationalität
Entscheidung
Test
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Güth, Werner
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Jena
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2008