Arbeitspapier
Through Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 6/2000
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Subject
-
learning
Cournot oligopoly
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Huck, Steffen
Normann, Hans-Theo
Oechssler, Jörg
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Huck, Steffen
- Normann, Hans-Theo
- Oechssler, Jörg
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Time of origin
- 2000