Arbeitspapier

Through Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 6/2000

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
learning
Cournot oligopoly

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Huck, Steffen
Normann, Hans-Theo
Oechssler, Jörg
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Huck, Steffen
  • Normann, Hans-Theo
  • Oechssler, Jörg
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Time of origin

  • 2000

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