Arbeitspapier
From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment
We explore the stability of imitation in a 1,200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff function but see the output quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, our oligopolies reach highly competitive levels within 50 periods. However, already after 100 periods quantities start to drop and, eventually fall deep into collusive territory without pausing at the Nash equilibrium. Our results demonstrate how groups of subjects can learn their way out of dysfunctional heuristics, and thus suggest the need for a new theory of how cooperation emerges.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2012-301r
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Thema
-
Cournot oligopoly
imitation
learning dynamics
cooperation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Friedman, Daniel
Huck, Steffen
Oprea, Ryan
Weidenholzer, Simon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Friedman, Daniel
- Huck, Steffen
- Oprea, Ryan
- Weidenholzer, Simon
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2012
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment
From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
Through trial & error to collusion
Merger and collusion in contests
Merger and collusion in contests
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Through Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment
From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
Through trial & error to collusion
Merger and collusion in contests
Merger and collusion in contests
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Through Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment
From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
Through trial & error to collusion
Merger and collusion in contests
Merger and collusion in contests
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Through Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence