Arbeitspapier
Through trial & error to collusion
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1999,57
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Huck, Steffen
Oechssler, Jörg
Normann, Hans-Theo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046474
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Huck, Steffen
- Oechssler, Jörg
- Normann, Hans-Theo
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Entstanden
- 1999
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