Arbeitspapier
From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper; No. 701
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
cournot oligopoly
imitation
learning dynamics
cooperation
Huck, Steffen
Oprea, Ryan
Weidenholzer, Simon
Santa Cruz, CA: University of California, Economics Department
- Rechteinformation
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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18.10.2021, 08:56 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Friedman, Daniel
- Huck, Steffen
- Oprea, Ryan
- Weidenholzer, Simon
- Santa Cruz, CA: University of California, Economics Department
Entstanden
- Santa Cruz, CA: University of California, Economics Department