Arbeitspapier
Dividing a Cake by Majority: The Simplest Equilibria
In a stochastic game of dividing a cake by majority, the simplest equilibria are the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) ones. The formal definition of simplicity and the computational methods of the equilibria make use of an automaton measure of complexity adopted for stochastic games.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 919
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baron, David
Kalai, Ehud
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1990
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baron, David
- Kalai, Ehud
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1990
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