Arbeitspapier
Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule.
We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting in an economy where ex-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in a higher expected level of investment in comparison to the case where social insurance is determined by an appointed social planner. We also find that, with voting-based renegotiation, the availability of costly ex-post information about private investment can help overcome commitment problems. These findings call into question the practice of using a representative-consumer approach when modelling dynamic policy problems in large economies.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2000-15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Anderberg, Dan
Perroni, Carlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
- (wo)
-
Copenhagen
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Anderberg, Dan
- Perroni, Carlo
- University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
Entstanden
- 2000
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