Arbeitspapier
Endogenous majority rules with changing preferences
This paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases. We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences depend on age and change over time in a systematic way. In this setting, we show that the first population of voters will choose a supermajority rule in order to influence the outcomes of future elections. We explore the robustness of the basic model and also find some empirical support for predictions derived from the model.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Research Report ; No. 2000-12
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
supermajority
taxation
constitution
overlapping generations
political economy
Abstimmungsregel
Steuerpolitik
Präferenztheorie
Politische Entscheidung
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Polborn, Mattias K.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
London (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Polborn, Mattias K.
- The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2000
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