Arbeitspapier
Endogenous majority rules with changing preferences
This paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases. We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences depend on age and change over time in a systematic way. In this setting, we show that the first population of voters will choose a supermajority rule in order to influence the outcomes of future elections. We explore the robustness of the basic model and also find some empirical support for predictions derived from the model.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Research Report ; No. 2000-12
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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supermajority
taxation
constitution
overlapping generations
political economy
Abstimmungsregel
Steuerpolitik
Präferenztheorie
Politische Entscheidung
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Polborn, Mattias K.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
London (Ontario)
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Polborn, Mattias K.
- The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2000
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