Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric majority pillage games

This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, "Pillage and property"), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games' predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents' intrinsic contributions to a coalition's power is identical. In the three-agent game studied: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set's existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2019-24

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Exchange and Production Economies
Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
Thema
power contests
core
stable sets

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kerber, Manfred
Rowat, Colin
Yoshihara, Naoki
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
(wo)
Amherst, MA
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kerber, Manfred
  • Rowat, Colin
  • Yoshihara, Naoki
  • University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2019

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