Arbeitspapier
Asymmetric majority pillage games
This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, "Pillage and property"), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games' predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents' intrinsic contributions to a coalition's power is identical. In the three-agent game studied: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set's existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2019-24
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Exchange and Production Economies
Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
- Thema
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power contests
core
stable sets
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Kerber, Manfred
Rowat, Colin
Yoshihara, Naoki
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Amherst, MA
- (wann)
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2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kerber, Manfred
- Rowat, Colin
- Yoshihara, Naoki
- University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2019