Arbeitspapier

Games without winners: Catching-up with asymmetric spillovers

Dynamic game with changing leader is studied on the example of R&D co-opetition structure. The leader benefits from higher followers' innovations rate and followers are enjoying a spillover from the leader. Leadership changes because of asymmetric efficiency of investments of players. It is demonstrated that under sufficiently asymmetric players there is no long-run leader in this game and all players act as followers. Moreover this outcome may be the socially optimal one. In decentralised setting additional complex types of dynamics are observed: permanent uctuations around symmetric (pseudo)equilibrium and chaotic dynamics. This last is possible only once strategies of players are interdependent. Cooperative solution is qualitatively similar for any number of players while market solution is progressively complex given all players are asymmetric. Results are extended to an arbitrary linear-quadratic multi-modal differential game with spillovers and the structure necessary for the onset of non-deterministic chaos is discussed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2018/12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Thema
technological spillovers
heterogeneous innovations
asymmetric players
social optimality
market inefficiency
multi-modal differential games
piecewise-smooth systems

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bondarev, Anton
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.5451/unibas-ep63899
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bondarev, Anton
  • University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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