Asymmetric majority pillage games

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, "Pillage and property"), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games' predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents' intrinsic contributions to a coalition's power is identical. In the three-agent game studied: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set's existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2019-24

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Exchange and Production Economies ; Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
• Subject: power contests ; core ; stable sets

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kerber, Manfred ; Rowat, Colin ; Yoshihara, Naoki
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
• (where): Amherst, MA
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/227890
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET