Arbeitspapier
Majority Vote on Educational Standards
The direct democratic choice of an examination standard, i.e., a performance level required to graduate, is evaluated against a utilitarian welfare function. It is shown that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low if the marginal cost of reaching a higher performance reacts more sensitively to ability for high than for low abilities, and if the right tail of the ability distribution is longer than the left tail. Moreover, a high number of agents who choose not to graduate may imply that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low even if these conditions fail.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6845
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Education
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Education: Government Policy
- Thema
-
examination
school
drop-outs
democracy
median voter
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schwager, Robert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schwager, Robert
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018
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