Konferenzbeitrag
Majority Vote on Educational Standards
The direct democratic choice of an examination standard, i.e., a performance level required to graduate, is evaluated against a utilitarian welfare function. It is shown that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low if the marginal cost of reaching a higher performance reacts more sensitively to ability for high than for low abilities, and if the right tail of the ability distribution is longer than the left tail. Moreover, a high number of agents who choose not to graduate may imply that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low even if these conditions fail.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Electoral Control ; No. B03-V3
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Analysis of Education
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Education: Government Policy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schwager, Robert
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Kiel und Hamburg
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Schwager, Robert
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2013