Konferenzbeitrag

Majority Vote on Educational Standards

The direct democratic choice of an examination standard, i.e., a performance level required to graduate, is evaluated against a utilitarian welfare function. It is shown that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low if the marginal cost of reaching a higher performance reacts more sensitively to ability for high than for low abilities, and if the right tail of the ability distribution is longer than the left tail. Moreover, a high number of agents who choose not to graduate may imply that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low even if these conditions fail.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Electoral Control ; No. B03-V3

Classification
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Education
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Education: Government Policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schwager, Robert
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel und Hamburg
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Schwager, Robert
  • ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2013

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