Arbeitspapier

United We Vote

This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences within the coalition.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 9.2006

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
Voting bloc
Coalition formation
Voting rule
Wahl
Koalition
Abstimmungsregel
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eguia, Jon X.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eguia, Jon X.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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