Arbeitspapier
United We Vote
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences within the coalition.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 9.2006
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Voting bloc
Coalition formation
Voting rule
Wahl
Koalition
Abstimmungsregel
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Eguia, Jon X.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
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2006
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Eguia, Jon X.
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2006