Arbeitspapier

Citizens should vote on secession

The draft treaty establishing a constitution for the European Union states that each member state may withdraw from the European Union following its own constitutional requirements. We argue that such a rule could lead into an increased use of threat of withdrawal to extract concessions in intergovernmental negotiations. This problem would be exacerbated by national electorates facing an incentive to elect more confrontational politicians. We also suggest a remedy: EU constitution should require that withdrawal from EU membership must be approved by the voters of the withdrawing member state in a referendum.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ETLA Discussion Papers ; No. 939

Classification
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Subject
Federalism
secession
the European Union
referendum
Federalismi
Euroopan Unioni
kansanäänestys
Mitgliedschaft
Europäische Integration
Separatismus
Referendum
Public Choice
EU-Staaten

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eerola, Essi
Määttänen, Niku
Poutvaara, Panu
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eerola, Essi
  • Määttänen, Niku
  • Poutvaara, Panu
  • The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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