Arbeitspapier

The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2013-209

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Thema
Condorcet Jury Theorem
information aggregation
majority voting
social information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Morton, Rebecca B.
Piovesan, Marco
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Morton, Rebecca B.
  • Piovesan, Marco
  • Tyran, Jean-Robert
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Entstanden

  • 2013

Ähnliche Objekte (12)