Arbeitspapier

The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2013-209

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Subject
Condorcet Jury Theorem
information aggregation
majority voting
social information

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Morton, Rebecca B.
Piovesan, Marco
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Morton, Rebecca B.
  • Piovesan, Marco
  • Tyran, Jean-Robert
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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