Arbeitspapier
Persistent bias in advice-giving
We show that a one-off incentive to bias advice has persistent effects. In an experiment, some advisers were paid a bonus to recommend a lottery which only risk-seeking individuals should choose to a less informed client. Afterwards, they had to choose for themselves and make a second recommendation to another client, without any bonus. These advisers choose the risky lottery and recommend it a second time up to six times more often than advisers in a control group who were never offered a bonus. These results are consistent with a theory we present which is based on advisers' image concerns of appearing incorruptible.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 228
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- Thema
-
advice-giving
conflict of interest
self-signaling
self-deception
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Chen, Zhuoqiong
Gesche, Tobias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-124325
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chen, Zhuoqiong
- Gesche, Tobias
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
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