Arbeitspapier
Charitable giving and intermediation
Charitable donations are often made through intermediaries who can fund themselves from these same donations. Donors who purchase charitable output through an intermediary incur a principal-agent problem with unobservable prices. We compare charitable giving in an experiment with and without intermediation. Different donor types emerge: 41 per-cent of all donors reduce their donation in response to intermediation, 59 per-cent of all donors give as much or more with than without intermediation. The price of charitable output does not explain these types and appears to only matter after taking characteristics of donors´ moral judgement into account.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2015-021
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
- Subject
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altruism
charitable giving
charitable institutions
intermediation
moral judgement reasoning
price elasticity
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Chlaß, Nadine
Gangadharan, Lata
Jones, Kristy
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena
- (where)
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Jena
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Chlaß, Nadine
- Gangadharan, Lata
- Jones, Kristy
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena
Time of origin
- 2015