Arbeitspapier

Charitable giving and intermediation

Charitable donations are often made through intermediaries who can fund themselves from these same donations. Donors who purchase charitable output through an intermediary incur a principal-agent problem with unobservable prices. We compare charitable giving in an experiment with and without intermediation. Different donor types emerge: 41 per-cent of all donors reduce their donation in response to intermediation, 59 per-cent of all donors give as much or more with than without intermediation. The price of charitable output does not explain these types and appears to only matter after taking characteristics of donors´ moral judgement into account.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2015-021

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
Subject
altruism
charitable giving
charitable institutions
intermediation
moral judgement reasoning
price elasticity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chlaß, Nadine
Gangadharan, Lata
Jones, Kristy
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena
(where)
Jena
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Chlaß, Nadine
  • Gangadharan, Lata
  • Jones, Kristy
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena

Time of origin

  • 2015

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