Arbeitspapier

Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving

A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. Behavior in a laboratory experiment suggests that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to act less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation – rather than its benefits – are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12869

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
social preferences
charitable giving
excuse-driven behavior
ambiguity
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Garcia, Thomas
Massoni, Sebastien
Villeval, Marie Claire
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Garcia, Thomas
  • Massoni, Sebastien
  • Villeval, Marie Claire
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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