The economics of advice

Arbeitspapier

A consumer wants to buy one of three different products. An expert observes which of the three products is the best match for the consumer. Under linear prices a monopolistic expert may truthfully reveal, may partially reveal, and may not reveal at all her information. The outcome is inefficient; moreover, the consumer gets some of the surplus. With a two-part tariff the expert truthfully reveals her information. The outcome is efficient and the expert appropriates the entire surplus. If experts are competitive, they also truthfully reveal; here all the surplus goes to consumers.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 22-14

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Consumer Protection ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: advice ; credence good ; horizontal product differentiation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Emons, Winand ; Lenhard, Severin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bern, Department of Economics
• (wo): Bern
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/278245
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ