Arbeitspapier
Preselection and expert advice
We study the effects of preselection on an expert's incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert's expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking for advice, alters the expert's perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 24-2015
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
reputation
cheap talk
safe haven
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schulte, Elisabeth
Felgenhauer, Mike
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
- (wo)
-
Marburg
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schulte, Elisabeth
- Felgenhauer, Mike
- Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
Entstanden
- 2015
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