Preselection and expert advice

Arbeitspapier

We study the effects of preselection on an expert's incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert's expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking for advice, alters the expert's perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 24-2015

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: reputation ; cheap talk ; safe haven

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schulte, Elisabeth ; Felgenhauer, Mike
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
• (where): Marburg
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121317
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET