Taxation of Annual Income as a Commitment Device

Konferenzbeitrag

I study a two-period model of nonlinear, information constrained income taxation. It is shown that time-consistent taxation of annual income welfare-dominates time-consistent taxation of lifetime income if preferences are such that stationary allocations are efficient. If uncertainty is taken into account and if state-contingent fiscal policy is not feasible, time-consistent taxation of annual income can also welfare-dominate taxation of lifetime income under commitment. These findings may help in explaining why governments usually tax annual rather than lifetime earnings.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Dynamic Aspects in Optimal Taxation ; No. F17-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
• Subject: nonlinear income taxation ; tax base ; time-consistency ; commitment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gaube, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (where): Frankfurt a. M.
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37486
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET