Arbeitspapier
Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment
We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies chosen by benevolent governments. Individual wages are determined by both innate abilities and education levels. Consistent with real world practices, the government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. Deviations from full commitment tend to make education policies more progressive, increasing the education subsidy for initially low skilled agents and decreasing it for initially high skilled agents. We provide suggestive cross-country correlations for this mechanism.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 14-16
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Analysis of Education
- Subject
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Education Policies
Time-Inconsistency
Taxation
Inequality
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Findeisen, Sebastian
Sachs, Dominik
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-366223
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Findeisen, Sebastian
- Sachs, Dominik
- University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2014