Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment

Arbeitspapier

We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies chosen by benevolent governments. Individual wages are determined by both innate abilities and education levels. Consistent with real world practices, the government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. Deviations from full commitment tend to make education policies more progressive, increasing the education subsidy for initially low skilled agents and decreasing it for initially high skilled agents. We provide suggestive cross-country correlations for this mechanism.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 14-16

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Analysis of Education
• Thema: Education Policies ; Time-Inconsistency ; Taxation ; Inequality

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Findeisen, Sebastian ; Sachs, Dominik
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129569
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-366223
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ