Debt maturity without commitment

Arbeitspapier

I analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Governments balance benefits of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default. Their choice of short- versus long-term debt affects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers. The equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that reflect the price impact of these decisions. The model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high, output low, or a cross default more likely. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2500

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Fiscal Policy ; International Lending and Debt Problems ; National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
• Subject: Debt ; maturity structure ; no commitment ; default ; Öffentliche Anleihe ; Laufzeit ; Debt Management ; Steuerpolitik ; Kreditrisiko ; Soziale Kosten ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Niepelt, Dirk
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26545
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET