Arbeitspapier

Auction Design without Commitment

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary equilibria are characterized in the language of vonNeumann-Morgenstern stable sets. This simplifies the analysis remarkably. In the one buyer case, we obtain the Coase conjecture: the buyer obtains all the surplus and efficiency is reached. However, in the multiple buyer case the seller can achieve more: she is able to commit to the English auction. Typically the converse also holds, the English auction is the only stable auction mechanism.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 24.2003

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Thema
Auction theory
commitment
stable sets
Auktionstheorie
Gleichgewichtsmodell
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vartiainen, Hannu
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vartiainen, Hannu
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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