Arbeitspapier

Pensions with early retirement and without commitment

In this paper it is shown that more generous early retirement provisions as well as lower employment lead to lower steady state pension rates if governments weigh the welfare of the older persons relatively strongly. A relatively stronger weight on the welfare of the young reverses the results. The driving forces behind those findings are governments that cannot commit to pension policies and consequently take into account future governments' policies when maximizing electoral support from the currently young and old constituencies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP I 2006-120

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Neugart, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Neugart, Michael
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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