Auction Design without Commitment

Arbeitspapier

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary equilibria are characterized in the language of vonNeumann-Morgenstern stable sets. This simplifies the analysis remarkably. In the one buyer case, we obtain the Coase conjecture: the buyer obtains all the surplus and efficiency is reached. However, in the multiple buyer case the seller can achieve more: she is able to commit to the English auction. Typically the converse also holds, the English auction is the only stable auction mechanism.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 24.2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Auctions ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: Auction theory ; commitment ; stable sets ; Auktionstheorie ; Gleichgewichtsmodell ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Vartiainen, Hannu
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118051
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET