Arbeitspapier
Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good information. Competition, however, may allow themarket and explicit contracts to crowd out implicit insurance, even though the latter yields higher welfare.Integrating the principal-agent and shirking models, we explain why different contracting modes coexist in quitehomogeneous industries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 01-020/3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Insurance
implicit contracts
moral hazard
principal agent
commitment
shirking
Unternehmensversicherung
Information
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bovenberg, A.L.
Teulings, Coen N.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
2025-03-10T11:45:04+0100
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bovenberg, A.L.
- Teulings, Coen N.
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2001
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