Arbeitspapier
The Welfare Effects of Discrimination in Insurance
We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply side. We use the model to investigate the welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection). We postulate that a test is available that determines whether an applicant's risk exceeds a treshold. Excluding the highest risks softens adverse selection, but constitutes a welfare loss for the high risks. In contrast to a lemons market intuition, we find that aggregate surplus decreases when risk aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination increases aggregate surplus.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-012/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Regulation and Business Law: Other
- Thema
-
insurance
adverse selection
risk selection
discrimination
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van der Noll, Rob
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van der Noll, Rob
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2006