Arbeitspapier

The Welfare Effects of Discrimination in Insurance

We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply side. We use the model to investigate the welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection). We postulate that a test is available that determines whether an applicant's risk exceeds a treshold. Excluding the highest risks softens adverse selection, but constitutes a welfare loss for the high risks. In contrast to a lemons market intuition, we find that aggregate surplus decreases when risk aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination increases aggregate surplus.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-012/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Regulation and Business Law: Other
Thema
insurance
adverse selection
risk selection
discrimination

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van der Noll, Rob
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van der Noll, Rob
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2006

Ähnliche Objekte (12)