Konferenzbeitrag
Taxation of Annual Income as a Commitment Device
I study a two-period model of nonlinear, information constrained income taxation. It is shown that time-consistent taxation of annual income welfare-dominates time-consistent taxation of lifetime income if preferences are such that stationary allocations are efficient. If uncertainty is taken into account and if state-contingent fiscal policy is not feasible, time-consistent taxation of annual income can also welfare-dominate taxation of lifetime income under commitment. These findings may help in explaining why governments usually tax annual rather than lifetime earnings.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Dynamic Aspects in Optimal Taxation ; No. F17-V3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
- Thema
-
nonlinear income taxation
tax base
time-consistency
commitment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gaube, Thomas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Gaube, Thomas
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Entstanden
- 2010
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