Arbeitspapier
Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation
Governments design taxation schemes to capture resource rent. However, they usually propose contracts with limited duration and possess less information on the resources than the extractive firms do. This paper investigates how information asymmetry on costs and an inability to commit to long-term contracts affect tax revenue and the extraction path. This paper assumes that governments maximize the tax revenue contingent on the quantity extracted. This study gives several unconventional results. First, when information asymmetry exists, the inability to commit does not necessarily lower tax revenues. Second, under asymmetric information without commitment, an efficient firm may produce during the first period more or less than under symmetric information. Hence, the inability to commit has an ambiguous effect on optimal contract duration. Third, an increase in the discount factor may shift the extraction towards the first period which contradicts Hotelling's rule.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 16/263
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Economics of Contract: Theory
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Thema
-
resource taxation
asymmetric information
commitment
Erschöpfbare Ressourcen
Optimale Besteuerung
Asymmetrische Information
Adverse Selektion
Steuereinnahmen
Hotelling-Regel
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ing, Julie
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ing, Julie
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2016
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