Strategy-proof Location on a Network

Arbeitspapier

We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a network of roads) based on the report of agents' symmetric, single-peaked preferences over points on that graph. We show that while a strategy-poof, onto rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle on the graph grants one agent a certain amount of decisive power. This result surprisingly characterizes the class of strategy-proof, onto rules both in terms of a certain subclass of such rules for trees and in terms of a parameterized set of generalized median voter schemes.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1253

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schummer, James ; Vohra, Rakesh V.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 1999

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221609
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ