Arbeitspapier
Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace
This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that altruism undermines the credibility of a threat of dis- missal but strengthens the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that higher altruism sometimes leads to higher bonuses, while lower altruism may increase productivity and players utility in equilibrium.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7363
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
spite
incentives
relational contracts
efficiency wages
subjective performance evaluation
Nash bargaining
Tichem, Jan
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dur, Robert A. J.
- Tichem, Jan
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013